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Enclaves for Enterprise: 
An Empirical Study of Singapore’s Industrial Parks 
 in Indonesia, Vietnam and China1  
  
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The dynamics of globalization have prompted governments to re-examine accustomed policies, and 
search for alternative strategies, in order to re-position their economies for the future. This paper 
explores the spatial context of state involvement in the new economics of competition, with the focus 
on Singapore’s much publicized, and controversial, orchestration of its state enterprise network to 
encapsulate economic space for Singapore-based firms to expand into the Asian region. This strategic 
initiative is promulgated on the exportability of Singapore’s ‘state credibility’, systemic and operational 
efficiencies, and technological competencies, to locations where these attributes are less certain. A 
logit model is applied to questionnaire surveys culled from Singapore’s industrial-township projects in 
Indonesia, Vietnam and China and the findings are presented. We conclude that the strategic 
advantage created for the firms within these privileged investment enclaves, though remarkable, is oft 
at risk from the administrative complexities, and socio-political milieu, of the host environments.  
 
 
Key words: Industrial Parks – Investment Enclaves - Singapore 
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 Enclaves for Enterprise:  
An Empirical Study of Singapore’s Industrial Parks  
in Indonesia, Vietnam and China 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last four decades, Singapore has risen to be Southeast Asia’s premier world-city, as 
well as an important base for multinational manufacturing. Singapore’s reputation for corruption-free2 
administration and infrastructural efficiency, coupled with the overall integrity of its legal and financial 
systems, have played a central role in attracting foreign direct investments to fuel the city-state’s 
economic development (Mirza 1986, Rodan 1989, Huff 1995). However, rising business costs – in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s – rendered it an imperative for Singapore’s economic planners to expand 
the island's investment horizons through an overseas direct investment program (Wong and Ng 1991, 
Regnier 1993). The main ideas were set out in the policy paper, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the 
Global Economy (Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB) 1988). The 1990 Global Strategies 
Conference and the 1993 Regionalization Forum added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB 
1990, 1993a), while the policy documents, Singapore Unlimited and Regionalization 2000, encapsulated 
the stratagem for Singapore’s participation in the dynamic growth of China, India, Indonesia and 
Vietnam (SEDB 1995a, 1995b). Outward direct investments expanded strongly in the late 1990s 
(Okposin 1999); presently, about 70 percent of Singapore’s outward FDI goes to Asia, but the relative 
share of ASEAN has declined with the increased importance of China and more recently, India. As 
with inward FDI, outward FDI has been influenced by government policy initiatives and incentives.  
 
Often perceived as an archetypal interventionist state (Rodan 1989, Huff 1995, Low 1998, 
Blomqvist 2001), Singapore’s strategy to remain economically competitive in the global economy can 
be interpreted as the building of platforms for national growth through the management of strategic 
alliances and ‘collaborations’ with private or semi-private enterprises on national economic projects. 
The Singapore government’s role as a facilitator and partner is evident from the creation of familiar 
Singapore-havens via industrial parks in neighboring countries and the restructuring of taxation 
policies (Singapore Ministry of Finance 1993, SEDB 1993b). The state also embarked on fostering 
trusted regional networks3 identical to those within its domestic market, whereby interlocking interests 
and perceived commonality of values, crystallized a system of cooperative competition. Implicit in this 
stratagem was the government’s intent to draw on its state enterprise network (or, in local parlance, 
Singapore Inc.), and extend this network to facilitate business ventures in the region (SEDB 1995b, 
Yeung 1998, Zutshi and Gibbons 1998). Theoretically, the ‘vested interests’ within the interlinked 
collaborative system serve to expedite processes, garner exclusive incentives, and negate inept 
bureaucracy. 
 
The strategy, itself, featured a plethora of state interventions. Involvement in the township 
development is threefold: firstly, senior politicians are enlisted to negotiate the projects’ institutional 
framework (which typically involved garnering special investment conditions in the host locations), and 
to secure endorsement from host-country governments, to give the projects political patronage and 
protection4. Secondly, ‘government-selected’ consortia, typically comprising Singapore government 
agencies and government-linked companies, take on the role of primary investors in infrastructure 
development. This is premised on the reluctance of private-sector firms to take on investments of such 
scale and long payback period. As well, the high risks involved in venturing into a relatively 
undeveloped and unfamiliar locale, where political, social and environmental conditions are suspect, 
compounded with uncertainty of investor interest, renders it inherently unattractive to private 
enterprises. Thirdly, the state actively markets and promotes the flagship projects to Singapore-based 
multinational enterprises (MNEs), on top of the internationalization of Singapore companies; as well, 
the presence of government agencies and government-linked companies, as ‘business architect’ and 
‘knowledge arbitrageur’, adds significant weight to the promotional efforts.  
 
                                                          
2
 Singapore was ranked 5th, behind Finland, New Zealand, Denmark and Iceland, in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perception Index 2004. 
 
3
 The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business practices preferred by the linked communities of ‘overseas 
Chinese’ (East Asia Analytical Unit 1995, Brown 1998), which Singapore made use of in its industrial parks in Indonesia and 
China.  
 
4
 Mechanisms include familiarization tours, formal and informal contacts amongst government officials, the constitution of ad-
hoc problem-solving committees, and visits by ministerial delegations that emphasize the establishment of interpersonal 
relationships. 
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In the next section, we outline the theoretical considerations that underscore Singapore’s 
regionalization strategy, followed by an introduction to, and explanation of the political and historical 
backgrounds of, the industrial parks referred to in our study. Thereafter, we detail the methodology of 
our field research, following which we present our findings and the preliminary conclusions we draw 
from them; and then, with reference to the empirical findings, we discuss the issues and challenges 
the parks face, and finally conclude that, while the parks have achieved some limited success, they 
have been, and remain, vulnerable to the combinations of socio-political and simple economic factors 
that radiate from their host environments. 
 
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
Dunning’s (1980, 1988, 2001) eclectic paradigm sought to provide the analytical basis for 
explaining the activities of firms situated beyond their national boundaries. The OLI paradigm was 
used to explain the ability and willingness of firms to serve markets, and to look into the reasons for 
their choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign production rather than domestic production, 
exports or portfolio resource flows through the interaction of Ownership-specific (O) advantages, 
Location-specific (L) advantages, and Internalization-incentive (I) advantages. This paradigm was 
reconfigured to constitute the ‘asset-augmenting’ aspects of FDI and MNC activity. For example, O-
advantages have been divided into static and dynamic; the former describing the advantages 
possessed by a firm which generate income at a given point of time and the latter illustrating the 
proprietary factors which allow a firm to enhance its incoming-generating assets over time. 
 
Dunning (1998a), Porter (1998), and others (e.g. Jovanovic 2003), have reiterated the 
importance of the spatial dimension, i.e. location-advantages as affecting the competitiveness of 
investing firms. Firms’ strategic choice of location reflects twin aims; to not only transfer their 
resources to the host countries, but gain access to the available strategic assets as well (Chen and 
Chen 1998, Makino and Delios 1996). Like O-advantages, L-advantages can also be classified as 
static and dynamic. While an industrial township facilitates companies’ resource-dependent operations 
with its static L-advantages, the geographical concentration of such activity also engenders dynamic L-
advantages such as asset-augmenting activities (e.g. R&D) and agglomeration benefits. Given their 
deeply entrenched sources, these dynamic L-advantages cannot be easily replicated elsewhere. 
Although firms may relocate knowledge and similar assets, assets with a public good or collective 
characteristic, cannot be easily moved (Markusen 1996). Transactional benefits of spatial proximity of 
firms are significant, especially for cases where transaction costs of traversing distances are high 
(Storper and Scott 1995, Dunning 1998b). As firms’ core competencies become increasingly 
knowledge-intensive, the location in which firms locate their production, organization and use of assets 
emerges as a critical competitive advantage.  
 
In similar vein, Porter emphasizes the prominence of location in competitive advantage in an 
increasingly complex, knowledge-based, and dynamic economy, as evidenced by the prevalence of 
clusters (Porter 2000a).  Although changes in technology have diminished many traditional roles of 
location (i.e. natural factor endowments and access to inputs), location remains crucial because of 
agglomeration and cluster benefits. These include important linkages and complementarities, 
knowledge spillovers, efficient infrastructure and specialized labor (Krugman 1991, Peck 1996). 
 
As created assets supersede natural factor endowments as a key determinant of location, the 
roles of governments in advancing the competitiveness of a country or region within a country need to 
be altered accordingly (Dunning 1995, 1997a). Inter alia, governments need to ensure that availability, 
quality and cost effectiveness of general purpose inputs match up to the standards of their global 
competitors, create and sustain an institutional framework and ethos that facilitates a continuous 
upgrading of the resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction and facilitate, rather than impede 
micro-regional clusters development and upgrading (Dunning 1997b, Stopford 1999, Porter 2000b).  
 
Singapore’s industrial township projects in Indonesia, China and Vietnam, represent 
collaborative efforts by the Singapore and respective local governments to create location-bound 
advantages within more uncertain environments, through a propitious combination of cost-effective 
factors of production, efficient infrastructure and management expertise; i.e., supplementing natural 
location-specific advantages with engineered ones crafted to attract foreign direct investments to the 
parks. Our field research, therefore, tests whether this mix of advantages has been successful in 
attracting investment to the parks; and, perhaps more importantly, the tangibility of, and the success of 
said advantages in retaining said investment; in the face of an ever-changing economic landscape and 
the mixed enthusiasm of potential investors. 
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3. SINGAPORE’S REGIONALIZATION GAMBIT 
 
The following case studies of the industrial parks in Indonesia, Vietnam and China serve to illustrate 
the prevalence of the Singapore government’s role in developing, managing and marketing these 
gargantuan overseas investments. As well, this strategic initiative can also take on an uncharted 
perspective of being an end in itself, that of exporting Singapore’s expertise in industrial infrastructural 
development across the region (Perry and Yeoh 2000). Locations of the three industrial parks are 
shown in Figure 1, and their operational statistics are set out in Table 1. 
 
3.1 Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), Indonesia 
 
The late 1960s witnessed Indonesia’s ambition to develop the Riau islands when Batam was 
identified as a potential logistics and operational base to support offshore oil and gas fields. The 1979 
master plan recognized the Riau islands with its location-specific advantages such as abundant land 
and cheap labor were well-positioned5 to address Singapore’s land and labor constraints and, more 
importantly, to take advantage of Singapore's established business and financial services network and 
the city-state's efficient facilities for communication, transportation and other services (Kumar and 
Siddique 1994, Grundy-Warr et al 1999). 
 
BIP was launched in 1992. The Park started as a joint venture between Singapore’s 
government-linked companies6 and the Salim Group of Indonesia. Salim was Indonesia’s largest 
business conglomerate, at the time, and had close links to senior politicians and privileged access to 
the major investment projects in the Riau Islands. Roles and responsibilities were distinctively 
segregated, with Salim providing a guarantee of priority with respect to regulatory controls, and the 
Singapore contributors taking control of the design, physical development and management of the 
estate, where it could leverage on its reputation for service efficiency and reliability to foreign investors  
 
BIP’s first tenants were mainly subsidiaries of American, European, and Japanese 
multinationals already operating in Singapore. Cumulative investments and export value in BIP topped 
US$1 billion and US$2 billion in 2004 respectively, and the number of tenants has increased from 17 
in 1991 to 82 in June 2004. Of these, 39 were Japanese companies with Singapore-owned companies 
the next largest concentration at 25. American and European investors have a limited presence. There 
is a concentration of electronics operations, mainly various component assembly processes, and 
supporting activities to the electronics sector such as plastic molding and packaging. There are over 
65,000 workers in BIP.  
 
3.2 Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) 
 
VSIP is Singapore’s flagship investment in Vietnam. The plan was first mooted in March 1994 
by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singapore’s then Prime Minister, Goh Chok 
Tong. Launched in 1996, the 500-hectare park is strategically located in Binh Duong Province, 17 km 
north of Ho Chi Minh City, and is within a 40-minute drive from the international airport and seaports. A 
self-contained, self-sufficient industrial park with prepared land plots, and ready-built factories, 
bolstered by Singapore-style management expertise and infrastructure support, VSIP offers investors 
a ‘hassle-free’, one-stop service, ready-built factories and Singapore-styled management expertise 
and infrastructure support. A 250,000-strong working population within a 15 km radius from VSIP 
provides a ready pool of low-cost, skilled labor.  
 
In VSIP, Singapore applied lessons learned from its China experience, and made deliberate 
efforts to foster strong collaboration with local authorities. A Management Board was set up, chaired 
by the Vice Chairman of the Binh Duong Province People's Committee, which pre-empted the 
perception that VSIP was a partnership forced upon by the central government. The Board, with 
representatives from the Ministries of Trade, Finance and Interior, as well as the General Customs 
Department, oversees the issue of investment licenses, import/export permits, and construction 
                                                          
5
 The cataclysmic collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s impressed upon Indonesia's economic planners the need for a more 
broad-based development strategy. The Riau islands were an obvious choice to encourage investments not least because 
Singapore has shown interest in leasing these nearby islands to transcend the city-state's need for inexpensive land and labor. By 
the late 1980s, the perception from Jakarta was that Singapore was "bursting at the seams", and that the time was right to position 
Batam and the other Riau islands to take advantage of the spill-over from Singapore. 
 
6
 The Singapore consortium was led by Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp Industries) and Jurong 
Town Corporation, Singapore’s main industrial estate infrastructure developer. 
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permits. VSIP is jointly developed by a Singapore consortium7 led by SembCorp Industries and 
Becamex, a Vietnamese state-owned enterprise in Binh Duong Province. 
 
VSIP’s first tenants included 3M, Sandoz, Sakata Inx, Godrej (India), Liwayway Food 
Industries, and a mix of Singaporean firms like ST Automotive and Star Chemicals. Unlike BIP, where 
the focus on electronics and other light industries complements the restructuring of Singapore’s 
manufacturing sector, VSIP is less selective in its tenant profile; the tenant-mix reflects the 
overwhelming importance of Asian MNEs, while the sector mix ranges from textiles, to electronics and 
pharmaceuticals. Singaporean and non-Asian companies are represented in a mix of industries, while 
the Japanese companies are largely concentrated in electronics. VSIP’s major tenants include Konica, 
Nitto Denko, Kimberly-Clark, Diethelm and Roche. Investment commitments are currently valued in 
excess of US$700 million, in a broad swathe of industries – food, electrical and electronics, 
pharmaceuticals and healthcare, specialty materials, consumer goods and light industries. VSIP has 
138 committed tenants from 21 countries, of which 80 are already operational. 26000 jobs have been 
created, with the number expected to rise to 40 000 when the rest of the tenants start their 
operations8. VSIP posted its first profits in 2002. 
 
3.3 China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP) 
 
CS-SIP was officially launched on May 12, 1994, and touted as a locale offering abundant 
labor, and other local resources, at competitive costs, and in proximity to target markets. These 
primary factors were purportedly enhanced and strengthened by world-class infrastructure within the 
park, strong commitment and support from the local authorities, and growing bilateral economic 
cooperation between Singapore and China. The project was jointly developed by a consortium of 
Chinese and Singapore-based investors known as the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
Development Company (CSSD). The Chinese partners held a 35 per cent stake, while the Singapore 
consortia took a 65 per cent stake9. The two consortia retained separate identities and responsibilities, 
taking up projects according to their agreed roles (SIPAC 1999).  
 
 However, barely five years into the project, Singapore acknowledged that the original vision of 
transferring its industrial-development model to Suzhou was a much more complex and challenging 
process than previously envisaged. Singapore’s disappointment was pointedly highlighted by then 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s public questioning of the commitment of the Chinese partners to the 
project10. By early 1999, the township had attracted a resident population of only 5,000 against a 
target of 600,000; the park was employing 14,000 workers, while the original target was 360,000. The 
slow progress resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led consortium, which funded the land 
development and infrastructure, and also for Singaporean investors involved in peripheral projects. 
Official estimates placed Singapore’s investment in CS-SIP at only US$147 million.  
These, and other, protracted difficulties11 led to the announcement in 1999 that Singapore 
would stop pouring in additional investments and, pari passu, would transfer majority ownership of the 
park to the Chinese partners, with the latter taking a 65 per cent stake in the new alignment of 
interests12. Interestingly, SIP performance turned around within a year following the transfer of 
majority ownership and management control. Since then, there has been a strong influx of investment. 
Investment in CS-SIP currently stands at US$16 billion13, and 75 000 jobs have been created. The 
                                                          
7
 Other members include Temasek Holdings, Ascendas International, United Overseas Land, Salim’s KMP Group and 
Mitsubishi Corporation. 
 
8
 Source: VSIP Fact Sheet, May 2004. 
 
9
 The Chinese consortia’s 35 percent stake was shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly national state-owned enterprises and 
investment companies of the Suzhou city, Jiangsu province. The Singapore consortium’s 65 percent stake was distributed 
amongst 24 organizations, mainly Singapore GLCs, and the Salim Group (through a subsidiary, KMP China Investments). 
 
10
 The Straits Times, 1997, December 5 (SM Lee unhappy over Suzhou park progress).  
 
11
 This is now an extensive literature on the problems encountered in the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park project 
including scholarly works (e.g.  Pereira, 2003); feature articles in popular magazines such as Asia Week, Far Eastern Economic 
Review, Fortune, Forbes and The Economist, and an unpublished (confidential) report commissioned by the Singapore 
government.  
 
12
 The Straits Times, 1999, June 30 (The Suzhou experiment); South China Morning Post, 1999, June 29 (Singapore drops 
control of Suzhou park).  
 
13
 Source: The Business Times, June 9, 2004 (Suzhou Park: 10 Years On). 
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Park, named as one of nine “next frontier tech cities” of the world by Newsweek, has established its 
status as an investment hub for high-tech industries and 51 Fortune 500 companies. A significant 
proportion of the tenants originate from the US and Europe, and over 70% of their investments are in 
electronics, information technology and other high-tech segments. The completion of the second and 
third phase of the transportation network and other infrastructure developments, at an estimated cost 
of US$10 billion, is in progress. The infrastructure development for the entire 70 sq km site is due for 
completion over the next two years. CSSD has plans to be listed by 2005 in China, and possibly in 
Singapore. 
 
4. FIELD RESEARCH 
 
Each of the three industrial parks discussed in this paper has been in operation for at least 
seven years, and are now established parks which catalyzed the development of similar industrial 
parks (e.g. Panbil Industrial Park and Citra Buana in Indonesia, Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone in 
Vietnam, and the Suzhou New District in China) in close proximity to the Singapore parks. Analysis of 
the Singapore-styled parks, relying primarily on secondary data from official publications and press 
reports, is not enough to ascertain the situation on the ground. To obtain primary data from the tenants 
of parks, we applied the questionnaire developed in Yeoh et al (2000), and surveyed the tenants in 
three of Singapore’s overseas industrial parks on the differential impact of various pull factors on firms’ 
investment decisions, along with the differential impact of different types of constraints on their 
operations. 
 
4.1 Methodology 
4.1.1 Questionnaire Survey 
The questionnaire was designed as a comparative study to investigate the various factors 
influencing firms' investment decisions along with the problems faced by their operations. The question 
sets for the tenants in the three industrial parks are similar. The surveys sought to highlight the 
different push/pull factors facing the park tenants when they chose to relocate their operations in the 
respective parks, and the operating constraints faced by the respective park tenants. The survey 
focused on three main areas. Firstly, the basic profile of the respondent: type of ownership, nature of 
operations, number of employees, sales turnover and its market orientation. Secondly, the factors that 
attracted the respondents to invest in the park. Data on various constraints was gathered in the third 
section.  
 
Questionnaire surveys were conducted in Indonesia, Vietnam and China, from December 
2002 to August 2004. A total of 125 responses were collected from industrial-park tenants. Of these, 
25 (29% of BIP tenants) were located in Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP) in Indonesia, 47 (34% of 
VSIP tenants) were located in the Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) in Vietnam, and the 
remaining 53 (9% of CS-SIP tenants) were located in the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
Limited (CS-SIP) in China. In all cases, the surveyed tenants were carefully selected so as to obtain a 
representative distribution of all tenants in the park across both industry and nature of operations; to 
illustrate this distribution, the respondents were further reclassified in terms of type of ownership, 
nature of their operations, number of employees, and target markets. This profile is presented in Table 
2. The surveys were conducted through face-to-face interviews in the case-study parks lasting an 
average of 45-60 minutes, with staff in senior managerial positions or above present in all cases, to 
ensure the holistic and accurate nature of the obtained responses. 
 
4.1.2 Logit Model 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses relating 
to factors and constraints, the logit model was applied to compare the perceived advantages 
influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the case-study parks. The logit model, estimated by 
maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
 
1
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Where:   Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park 
  Zi is a linear function of the pull factors defined as   
∑
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Where:   Fj = 1 if the factor j is selected, 0 otherwise 
  α0 = constant term 
  αj = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
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A similar model was also applied to the push factors (constraints) faced by the tenants in these parks. 
Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant, would suggest that the firm 
choosing that particular advantage/constraint is more likely to be a factor among tenants in that 
particular park than in those from the other industrial parks included in the survey. For example, where 
VSIP is the dependent variable, if the coefficient of F1 is positive and significant, this would suggest 
that, after taking into account the effects of other advantages, a firm choosing ‘Political commitment 
from the Singapore government’ has a higher probability of being a firm located in VSIP i.e. political 
commitment from the Singapore government was a significant pull factor for VSIP tenants, as opposed 
to tenants in BIP or CS-SIP. 
 
4.2 Findings 
 
4.2.1 Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decision to Locate in the Case-Study Parks (Table 3) 
 
 The main leverage of the Singapore-styled industrial parks rests firmly on the export of the 
city-state’s infrastructural development expertise, and on the low-cost labor available in the host 
environments. Not unexpectedly, then, the reliable and efficient Singapore-styled infrastructure was 
the Parks’ main draw, with 84%, 77% and 72% of the BIP, VSIP and CS-SIP tenants surveyed citing it 
as a advantage that influenced them to locate in their respective parks. Singapore, then, appears to 
have succeeded in exporting its ‘expertise’ in infrastructure development and creating a location-
advantage which is clearly in demand by companies in the South East Asian region. Additionally, our 
logit results re-affirm the importance of infrastructural facilities to CS-SIP, in particular, with a positive 
and statistically significant α3 (=1.046); this being due to the park’s need to support more 
technologically-sophisticated industries, as compared to the low-cost, labor-intensive manufacturing 
activities in BIP and VSIP. 
 
Similarly, another perceived advantage of BIP was ‘competitive labour costs’, with 80% of the 
tenants indicating so, making this factor the second-ranked factor in popular ranking; not unexpected, 
considering that BIP serves as a low-cost investment enclave, and a large proportion of the tenants in 
BIP engage in labour-intensive manufacturing activities. The other low-cost enclave in VSIP, however, 
seemed to place cheap labour in rather lower regard, with only 43% of tenants stating it to be an 
advantage that drew them to the park. Our logit results, however, suggest that this factor was 
comparatively a deciding factor between the three parks for tenants in both VSIP and BIP, with a 
positive and highly significant α6 (=2.625) and α6 (=2.186) respectively; a result that is, however, 
explained by the simple fact that not a single one of the CS-SIP respondents mentioned this factor, 
clearly outlining the comparative importance of cheap labour to VSIP and BIP, as compared to CS-
SIP, where it seems to be not an issue at all. China’s much-touted and much-maligned ‘cheap labour’ 
proved to be quite not in evidence here; indeed, anecdotal evidence from our on-site interviews 
pointed to a tight labor market in Suzhou, and one oft-heard refrain suggests that CS-SIP companies 
have had to pay a premium for workers with the requisite skills. On a related note, tying with cheap 
labour in BIP’s popular rankings was ‘competitive overhead costs’, and a positive and statistically 
significant α7(=2.880) differentiated the BIP respondents from those in the other two parks.  
Significantly, in terms of popular rankings, this factor ranked ninth in both VSIP and CS-SIP; 
suggesting that costs, overall, seem to be very much more of a concern for BIP tenants than VSIP and 
CS-SIP tenants. 
 
Access to overseas markets was rather more of a consideration for VSIP tenants than for 
tenants in the other two parks, as indicated by the positive and statistically significant α8 (=2.904), and 
in sharp contrast to the negative and statistically significant α8 (=-4.704) for CS-SIP, which would 
suggest a disinclination for tenants interested in access to overseas markets to locate in CS-SIP. This 
can be explained, in part, by VSIP’s tenant profile (comprising mostly Asian firms) and the Park’s 
positioning as an export platform for these firms into the region; the fact that the majority of these 
tenants are involved in the production of consumer products would seem to support this explanation. 
We note, however, that from our respondent profiles, the major market for VSIP still appears to be the 
domestic market. On the other hand, Western and Japanese MNEs dominate the ‘landscape’ in CS-
SIP, and given their established global marketing and distribution networks, this ‘advantage’ is, in all 
likelihood, a non-issue; or even less than that, given that the majority of CS-SIP tenants (almost 50%) 
are involved in the provision of industrial services, with product manufacturing very much in the 
minority. Access to overseas markets is of little real benefit to service providers, and in fact might 
create more competition for them; we note, after all, that the vast majority (46 of 53 respondents) 
indicated the growing domestic market to be one of their target markets, possibly explaining the 
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negative logit results for CS-SIP. We note, however, that looking at the popular rankings, we find that 
access to overseas markets is lowly-ranked for BIP and CS-SIP, and only ranked 6th for VSIP; despite 
the comparative importance of this advantage, it is obviously not a generally major consideration for 
tenants in the three parks as a whole. Interestingly enough, while BIP tenants are, unlike VSIP and 
CS-SIP tenants, largely export-based, this factor appears to be one they are largely indifferent to; 
likely due to the large percentage of firms which produce intermediate products, which often are 
already part of fixed value-chains, with set destinations other than the target markets for the final 
products. 
 
 Another interesting observation, not inconsistent with the tenant profile in CS-SIP, is the 
positive and statistically significant α11(=3.488), indicating the comparative importance of major 
suppliers in the production network of CS-SIP respondents as opposed to respondents in the other 
two parks, and a negative and significant α10 (=-6.452), suggesting that the presence of major buyers 
within the park was, in the same way, comparatively less critical to their operations; perhaps due to 
higher-level services and industries that require a range of raw materials and quick and efficient supply 
networks, and for which distance to customers is not an issue. As well, the negative and highly 
significant α11 (=-3.001) for VSIP is consistent with a tenant profile that does not require the presence 
of major suppliers for operational efficiency. BIP tenants, on the other hand, tread the middle ground; 
tenants in this park, it seems, do not care particularly where their buyers and suppliers are or how 
accessible they might be, placing only an average emphasis on either – an observation not 
inconsistent with the intermediate product-focused tenant profile. 
 
On a broader front, political commitment from the Singapore government was a distinctly more 
important consideration for BIP tenants than VSIP or CS-SIP tenants, as indicated by the positive and 
statistically significant α1(=2.997). This can be explained by the instability of Indonesia’s political 
system. The post-Soeharto era was significant for BIP, as many firms pulled out of BIP during the 
political unrest. The situation was further exacerbated by the frequent changes in political leadership, 
with five presidents in the past six years. Key economic positions were reshuffled and economic 
advisors changed frequently, as power jockeying among the parties, ministries, legislature, central 
bank, and other institutions continued. All these serve to complicate investors’ assessment of 
Indonesia’s political outlook, making it imperative for the Singapore authorities to signal its political 
commitment to the progress of the Park. As well, political commitment from the Indonesian 
government became particularly important in keeping the tenants’ confidence in BIP. Despite this, 
however, the popular rankings suggest that this political capital is still comparatively not a very major 
concern for tenants in the studied parks; only 6 and 7 respondents respectively from VSIP and CS-SIP 
cited this factor as an affirmative pull factor, and even for BIP it is only ranked 6th in the popular 
rankings; suggesting that tenants were, in general, much more concerned with operational 
considerations, such as the reliable Singapore-styled infrastructure facilities, than with the Singapore 
government’s other supposedly major contribution, its much-vaunted political commitment to the 
success of the parks. In contrast, though not unexpectedly, political commitment from the host 
government was pivotal to the respondents’ investment decision in all three case-study parks, 
occupying one of top four spots in the popular rankings in each park, as well as, surprisingly, the host 
of investment incentives meant to entice multinationals to locate their lower value-added activities in 
these self-contained enclaves; incentives that, contrary to popular literature on the effectiveness of 
such lures, seem to have served their purpose quite admirably. Unsurprisingly, our logit results found 
no statistical significance in the figures for either of these factors; quite obviously, both factors are 
equally critical to tenants in all three parks. 
 
4.2.2 Major Constraints on the Respondents’ Operations (Table 4) 
 
BIP, VSIP and CS-SIP are now established industrial-estate developments, but our study 
alludes to some emerging constraints which have undermined the attractiveness of the Parks. These 
constraints are categorized into three broad groups, namely, those relating to labour, those relating to 
organization and technology, and those relating to the economic ‘environment’, such as government 
policies and regulations. 
 
4.2.2.1 Labour-related constraints 
The ‘cheap’ labour resources which drew companies to Indonesia proved to be mere 
perception rather than reality in BIP, as ‘rising labour costs’ was one of the main constraints faced by 
78% of the BIP tenants. Industrial relations problems exacerbated the difficulties faced by BIP tenants, 
which perform predominantly labour-intensive activities, and which are substantiated statistically by 
63% of the BIP respondents; although surprisingly, low labour productivity was only the 8th most 
quoted constraint faced by BIP respondents. CS-SIP respondents, on the other hand, face both rising 
labour costs, which was ranked 4th as well as low labour productivity, which was ranked 3rd, with both 
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constraints comparatively more serious in CS-SIP than in BIP or VSIP, as indicated by the positive 
and significant β3 (=1.340) and β4 (=2.422) respectively; the park, however, seems to face no industrial 
relations problems, with only 1 respondent even citing it. Shortages of managers and other 
professionals were comparatively less critical to respondents in BIP (β2=-2.327) as, given Singapore’s 
proximity, the requisite manpower can be sourced at short notice; therefore BIP respondents ranked it 
only as their 8th most faced constraint, as opposed to VSIP and CS-SIP tenants, which placed it as the 
most and 2nd most serious constraint they respectively face; in CS-SIP, likely due to the higher level of 
operations among tenants in CS-SIP, and to the emphasis on service industries as opposed to 
manufacturing industries, but for VSIP perhaps pointing to a lack of sufficient educational and training 
facilities to produce the requisite professional labor. On the other hand, many VSIP tenants did not 
appear to face, either generally or comparatively, problems of rising labour costs, as indicated by the 
tied 11th ranked, and negative and significant β3 (=-2.587), or difficulties over low labour productivity, 
as suggested by the 8th ranked, and negative and statistically significant β4 (=-1.771), and also seemed 
to generally face few industrial relation problems, as indicated by the tied 11th rank. Instead, (and 
again, unlike BIP and, to a lesser extent, CS-SIP) VSIP tenants face a shortage of semi-skilled labour, 
citing it as their 2nd ranked constraint; a fact which, taken together with the above point on shortages of 
professionals and managers, would suggest that VSIP tenants in general are facing an acute labour 
shortage of requisite manpower. 
 
4.2.2.2 Organizational and technological-related constraints 
The Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also proved to be costly, as 
facilities such as the power plant, waste-treatment system and water supply are independently 
managed. This resulted in high overhead costs, especially in BIP where 74% of respondents cited it as 
a constraint they faced, and to some extent, in VSIP and CS-SIP, where the corresponding 
percentages are 38% and 34%, although a lack of statistically significant logit results suggests this to 
be an equally major constraint to all three parks; taken together with rising labour costs in BIP and CS-
SIP, it would seem that BIP tenants, in particular, are finding the promise of low costs that lured them 
there less than entirely fulfilled. Other organizational/technological constraints faced by BIP and VSIP 
tenants included difficulties in sourcing raw materials (ranked 5th in both) which, significantly, was not 
the case in CS-SIP, as indicated by the 13th rank and confirmed by the negative and highly significant 
β8(=-1.959). Unlike the promise of low costs in BIP, then, the presence of major suppliers in CS-SIP 
seems to have been one advantage that has actually materialized. 
 
4.2.2.3 ‘Environmental’ constraints 
Government regulation is a significant constraint for tenants in BIP and VSIP, evident from 
their positive α13 of 4.389 and 1.131 and 1st and 3rd rankings respectively; however, whereas 89% of 
BIP tenants cited this constraint, less than half of the VSIP respondents indicated likewise, accounting 
for the positive and highly significant β13 (=4.389) for BIP, and, perhaps more significantly, the 
negative and highly significant β13 (=-3.153) for CS-SIP. The significance of this for CS-SIP is clear, 
considering the countless number of incidents which relate back to the oft-cited ‘inefficient and corrupt’ 
bureaucracy in China; a bureaucracy which seems rather more friendly than its reputation would 
suggest, or at least, more friendly than governmental bodies overseeing BIP and VSIP. Competition 
from overseas competitors, on the other hand, was consistently a top-ranked constraint among 
respondents from all three parks, but was clearly the over-riding concern of the respondents in CS-SIP 
where, in terms of popular ranking, it was the most frequently cited constraint; nonetheless, logit 
results were not significant, indicating roughly equal attention paid to dealing with this constraint in all 
three parks. Clearly, while government control over the operating environment has proven more stifling 
to the operations of the tenants in BIP and VSIP, the economic landscape shaped by overseas 
competitors is very much ‘on the radar’ of all three parks’ tenants. 
 
52% of surveyed BIP tenants intend to expand within the Park over the next 5 years, 
compared to 61% in VSIP. However, 41% of surveyed BIP tenants plan to retain the current size of 
operations within the next 5 years, compared to 22% in VSIP. Only a few respondents signalled plans 
to scale down operations, or relocate from these two parks, suggesting a high degree of economic 
inertia amongst current tenants. This observation lends support to the Markusen-hypothesis on ‘sticky 
places in slippery space’, and is best summed up by the comments proffered by an MNE in BIP: 
‘moving to other locations would be cost-prohibitive, given the huge amount of costs the company has 
sunk into our BIP operations.’ Sentiments among CS-SIP tenants were exceptionally upbeat, with 
almost all the respondents intending to scale up their operations; reflecting, in our assessment, the 
strategic advantages engendered within the CS-SIP environment, set against the broader context of 
the dynamism of the host economy.  
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5. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
Foreign investment is attracted to investment enclaves or ‘shady places’ (Lundan, 2003), and 
agglomerate in and around centers of international infrastructure (Peck, 1996). The Singapore-
developed parks sought to capitalize on this dynamic by combining superior infrastructure with a 
plethora of often exclusive investment concessions acquired through negotiations with local 
stakeholders. The special privileges secured by Singapore’s flagship projects were, as noted above, 
unprecedented and unique (at least initially) to the parks, providing an edge over competing locations. 
For instance, the parks were allowed to construct and operate on-site power and water treatment 
plants, and telecommunications facilities; as a result, the parks enjoy the reputation of reliable 
infrastructural facilities in areas where these facilities are an anomaly. Furthermore, the management 
boards of the parks usually include local government officials, an arrangement which was to facilitate 
the parks’ privileged access to investment approvals, endorsements for construction activities, 
import/export permits and immigration-related permissions. The synergistic combination of these 
factors would render the parks self-sufficient and capable of offering investors the formulaic one-stop 
service Singapore-styled infrastructure is known for; service otherwise uncommon in emerging 
economies beset with administrative uncertainties. In addition, the parks would (supposedly) attain 
credibility through their inherent association with Singapore, which enjoys a positive reputation with 
multinational corporations for its stable, corrupt-free business ethos. As well, the strategic alliances 
between Singapore’s own state enterprise networks, and its counterparts in the regional sites, were 
instrumental in mobilizing the financial resources to complete these multi-million projects and, in most 
cases, within a comparatively short time frame of 18 to 24 months.  
 
Our empirical findings ascertain the following: the investment-friendly institutional framework 
laid by the Singapore and host governments, factor availability, the provision of superior infrastructure 
and, in the case of BIP, proximity to Singapore (both physical and political) were instrumental in 
engendering a competitive environment within the case-study parks. Tenants within the parks reaped 
significant advantages by tapping on the low-cost competitive environments and relying on 
Singapore’s infrastructure, management and expertise. Furthermore, Singapore’ positive reputation 
with MNEs for it stable, corruption-free investment environment lent credibility, to the extent that 
locating within the parks, in cases, had the side effect of lending a measure of prestige to the firm. 
 
Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, even the strategically engineered inter-government 
endorsement of the flagship projects, and the enormous resources mobilized through the strategic 
partnerships, have failed to shield the Parks from a gamut of all too practical problems. The following 
observations update, and offer new insights, on recent developments in the industrial-township 
projects.  
 
5.1 Heightened competition 
Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are facing mounting competition from competing parks 
within their vicinity. Competitor parks, some of which are backed by prominent Indonesian politicians, 
have burgeoned around BIP. Panbil Industrial Park, for example, one of the competitor parks and one 
offering facilities comparable to those in BIP, is located just opposite BIP; and many of its competitors 
are able to offer more attractive rates than BIP, a matter of distinct concern at a time when costs (both 
material and labour) in BIP are rising and when cost-conscious tenants, such as those in BIP, might be 
experiencing a change of heart. VSIP’s attractiveness has been similarly eroded by competition from 
newer industrial estates such as the Linh Trung Export Processing Zone, on top of incumbents like the 
Tan Thuan Export Processing Zone. Established by experienced and street-savvy developers from 
Taiwan, China and Thailand, these competitor parks market themselves aggressively on price, 
charging lower transportation fees accruing from more strategic locations.  And from the onset, CS-
SIP faced tremendous competition from the adjacent Suzhou New District as local officials chose to 
promote the latter over the former. This competition has somewhat subsided after control over CS-SIP 
was handed over to the Chinese partners, and the interests of the Singapore and local stakeholders 
came into somewhat better alignment; nonetheless, CS-SIP continues to face competition from the 
nearby Pudong New Area and China’s five special economic zones in Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, 
Xiamen and Hainan. These industrial centers are part of China’s larger strategy to attract foreign 
investments, and share similar privileges and status as CS-SIP. In recent years, these locations have 
upgraded their industrial structure and innovated on their management systems, rendering themselves 
increasingly competitive vis-à-vis CS-SIP. The simple economics of competition have called into 
question the premium attached to the ‘superior infrastructure’ in Singapore’s industrial-investment 
enclaves; and all of the parks’ supposedly exclusive investment incentives will, in all likelihood, prove 
no more than a temporary advantage over the rapidly improving competition. 
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5.2 Changes in Political ‘Allegiances’   
In Indonesia, China and Vietnam, the personal ties that were critical for the success of the 
projects at the onset, have declined in certainty and influence. In the Indonesian projects, the reliance 
on the Salim Group was necessary in the context of the Indonesian system of ‘crony capitalism’ 
fostered by then-President Soeharto. However, Salim’s political and commercial influence has 
diminished in the post-Soeharto era. As well, inter-governmental endorsements no longer suffice to 
secure commitments at the lower tiers of government. Anecdotal evidence from our field interviews 
points to a more complex regulatory environment for foreign companies, as they have to deal more 
intensively with the provincial and sub-provincial (district) governments. BIP’s reputation as an 
investment enclave has also not been left unscathed by political developments in the wake of the 
Asian financial crisis, the September 11 attacks in the United States, the Bali-Jakarta bomb blasts and 
negative press reports on active terrorist cells within the region (Yeoh et al, 2004).  
 
In Vietnam, investments in VSIP were expected, in situ, to benefit from Singapore’s ability to 
secure special concessions. These initial expectations now seem roseate, as inter-government 
endorsement (in the spirit of ASEAN economic co-operation) has proved insufficient to secure similar 
commitment in the lower tiers of government. In VSIP, the influence of local administrators, and their 
interests in competing developments, has compromised the significance of inter-governmental 
endorsement of the project. The ‘special’ support from the local authorities has proved to be less 
significant than envisioned. Improvements on infrastructural projects have translated into a plethora of 
miscellaneous fees, and added to operating costs14, doubtless a far cry from the aid envisioned by the 
majority of tenants who were attracted by the Vietnamese government’s perceived political 
commitment to the project, who now find government regulation one of their greatest constraints. Our 
on-site interviews further reveal negative undercurrents over Singapore’s control and management of 
VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that tensions have begun to arise over Singapore-styled 
management practices, and these have materialized in perception differences, protracted conflicts and 
project delays; though not yet a major issue yet, it is without a doubt a growing one. Local sentiments 
towards the Singapore seem to mirror those expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi experience in China, albeit 
to a lesser degree. Significantly, SembCorp Industries has announced plans to divest itself of part of 
its stake in VSIP15 to reflect a better ‘alignment of interests’, even as the project is finally registering 
positive returns on its investment. 
 
In China, CS-SIP’s progress was initially hampered by an approach that was unsuited to the 
local administrative context. Although top-level leaders in China and Singapore endorsed the project, 
this did not automatically translate into cooperation at the lower tiers of government. Instead, local 
authorities chose to promote the existing Suzhou New District, arguably on the basis that they had 
greater ownership in this development, as opposed to CS-SIP, which Singapore controlled. Since 
2001, this misalignment of interests has been rectified by the handover of control to the Chinese, and 
the appointment of key officials, previously steering Suzhou New District, to leadership positions in 
CS-SIP. The realignment of interests has, at face value, resolved the ‘paradox of context’ (Thomas, 
2001; Pereira, 2003) which encumbered the CS-SIP initiative. However, CS-SIP yet shares the 
political patronage of the Chinese officials with many of its competitors. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The progress of Singapore’s overseas parks over a comparatively short period of time 
indicates the ability of the Singapore’s state enterprise network to mobilize economic and political 
resources to create economic space for the city-state. The projects have obtained special investment 
conditions within their overseas localities, and government endorsements which further underline the 
significance of the projects. Nonetheless, we find that certain complexities of the individual 
environments, as well as the rude intrusion of the economics of competition, have hindered the 
progress and hobbled the commercial effectiveness of the parks. 
 
In Indonesia, BIP has attracted a significant level of foreign investments, fulfilling the intended 
niche of accommodating industrial investments from investors that are most at risk from administrative 
uncertainties, and lending credence to Singapore’s positive reputation with the multinationals. BIP is 
now a well-established project, but it has not necessarily achieved all its development goals. It has 
been a springboard for Singapore-Indonesian co-operation in Indonesia’s Riau Province, but it is not 
yet clear that Singapore has obtained the resource benefits looked for. BIP has been struggling to gain 
                                                          
14
 Corruption remains endemic. The Vietnamese government itself recently estimated that light-fingered bureaucrats creamed 
off at least 20% of the infrastructure spending (The Economist, September 14, 2002).  
 
15
 The Straits Times, December 1, 2003 (SembCorp Park Viet Venture Turns Profitable). 
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investment momentum, arising both from the increased competition for foreign investments and the 
restricted appeal of its operating conditions. The promised cost advantages of BIP have been less 
than evident, and over the longer term, the political uncertainties and policy nuances that radiate from 
Jakarta are unlikely to add to investor confidence. As gleaned from our on-site interviews, BIP would 
currently seem to have economic inertia on its side, as tenants find the cost of moving prohibitive; but 
this is, unquestionably, not truly an ‘advantage’. Inertia, after all, is hardly an attractive force; 41 per 
cent of our BIP-based respondents can attest to that. 
 
In Vietnam, Singapore’s investment in VSIP takes on an added dimension of rendering 
development assistance to an ASEAN partner, overtly to foster greater bilateral ties. It is apparent 
from the mix of ‘targeted’ industries, and the style of park management and operations, that the 
intention is for the local partners to have a stronger sense of ownership of the project. The focus on 
specific industries that complement Singapore’s economic restructuring is absent, unlike in BIP.  All 
the same, underlying vested interests to secure the city-state’s economic interests can be associated 
with this seeming act of camaraderie. Notwithstanding these explicit and implicit objectives, we submit 
that heightened competition and endemic corruption in the host environment work in tandem to test 
this strategic initiative; a combination of rising overhead costs and a tight labour market, together with 
rather more anaemic support from local authorities than anticipated by investors are placing growing 
pressure on the park and its tenants. Nonetheless, the park’s competitiveness, while dented, is yet 
intact, and remains a draw to potential tenants. 
 
In China, CS-SIP can be perceived as a strategic thrust by the Singapore government to 
capitalize upon first-mover advantages in a regional economy with immense market potential. As the 
first entrant to develop and manage a state-of-the-art industrial park, CS-SIP could arguably enhance 
Singapore’s reputation for infrastructure efficiency and corrupt-free administration. More subtly, its 
apparent success would leverage various Singapore companies’ foray into leverage Singaporean 
companies’ foray into China’s aggressive infrastructure plans and commercial-residential township 
projects. Following the handover to the Chinese partners, CS-SIP has indeed been doing very well for 
itself, as can be seen both from its ‘paper results’, and from the upbeat tone of the respondents from 
the park. However, several labor issues remain to be resolved, as well as the endemic ‘Singapore-
symptomatic’ problem of rising overhead costs; minor issues that might as yet balloon into major ones 
as more and more global entrants seek to tap on China’s enormous domestic potential, much as CS-
SIP is doing. 
 
To summarize, then, our study suggests the theorizations that underscored Singapore’s 
regionalization stratagem and, pari passu, the strategic advantage created for the firms within these 
privileged investment enclaves, though remarkable and unquestionably tangible, are oft at risk from 
the administrative complexities and socio-political milieu, that radiate from the host environments. Our 
paper contends that Singapore’s calculated, schematized efforts at transborder industrialization, in 
concert with regional governments and business elites, have been overly optimistic, more often than 
not frustrated by the intricacies of socio-political and economic realities in the host economies; and 
that the Singapore formula, applied to the variables of economic competition in these host economies, 
have proven to add up to rather different results. That said, official commitment to Singapore’s 
regionalization initiatives remains, as does the willingness of Singapore’s planners to search for 
alternative strategies to re-position regionalization efforts. Perhaps, in the process of re-thinking these 
initiatives, the ‘real politik’ of transferring ‘Singapore Unlimited’ to emerging economies will elicit a 
more incisive scrutiny; one, perhaps, along slightly more economic and case-specific lines. 
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FIGURE 1 
 
Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
in Indonesia, Vietnam and China 
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TABLE 1 
Operational Statistics of Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
in Indonesia, Vietnam and China 
 
Source: SembCorp Industries, Ascendas International,  
and China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Development Company (CSSD) 
 
 
TABLE 2  
Profile of Respondents 
Parks BIP VSIP SIP 
Surveyed tenants 25 47 53 
Ownership 
Singapore 6 10 13 
Joint venture 5 2 6 
Foreign owned 14 35 34 
Nature of 
Operation 
Consumer products 6 20 4 
Intermediate products 14 12 9 
Capital goods 0 1 5 
Industrial services 5 3 26 
Others 0 13 15 
Number of 
employees 
Less than 100 people 1 29 37 
100-500 people 11 9 13 
More than 500 people 13 9 3 
Target 
market 
ASEAN 15 18 7 
East Asia 15 13 28 
OECD 16 9 18 
Domestic Market 3 29 46 
 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey
 
BIP 
(Jun 2004) 
VSIP 
(May 2004) 
SIP 
(Feb 2004) 
Year of Operation 1990 1997 1994 
Scale of Development (hectares) 
Investment by Developer (US$ million) 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up  (hectares) 
Investment by Tenants (US$ million) 
Export Value (US$ million) (2003) 
No. of Employees 
500 
470 
85 
320  
> 1,000 
> 2,000 
65,000 
500 
400 
138 
320 
700 
207.6  
26,000 
7000 
12,400 
573 
980 
15,200 
5,960 
137,029 
TABLE 3 
Factors Affecting Respondents’ Decision to Locate in BIP/VSIP/CS-SIP 
(by frequency, popular ranking, and maximum likelihood estimate) 
 
 BIP VSIP CS-SIP 
Factors Freq Rank α coeff. p-value Freq Rank α coeff. p-value Freq Rank α coeff. p-value 
Political commitment from S’pore government 15 6 2.997 0.007* 6 9 -1.462 0.043** 7 8 -0.534 0.592 
Political commitment from host government 19 4 -0.346 0.695 37 1 1.062 0.123 38 2 -1.166 0.216 
Infrastructure facilities 21 1 0.722 0.515 36 2 -1.005 0.175 38 2 1.046 0.099*** 
Investment incentives 19 4 -0.571 0.524 30 3 -0.639 0.308 40 1 0.550 0.495 
Presence of skilled labor 14 8 0.500 0.602 12 7 0.133 0.850 13 5 -1.241 0.163 
Competitive labor cost 20 2 2.186 0.013** 20 5 2.625 0.003* 0 12 -22.370 0.996 
Competitive overhead cost 20 2 2.880 0.001* 6 9 -3.193 0.002* 4 9 0.160 0.891 
Access to overseas market 13 9 0.994 0.246 15 6 2.904 0.001* 1 10 -4.704 0.002* 
Access to domestic market 5 12 -2.365 0.040** 22 4 2.002 0.001* 12 6 -1.132 0.119 
Presence of major buyer 15 6 1.168 0.388 11 8 1.132 0.290 1 10 -6.452 0.061*** 
Presence of major supplier 13 9 0.549 0.691 4 11 -3.001 0.001* 22 4 3.488 0.012** 
Presence of major competitors 8 11 0.557 0.674 1 12 -3.139 0.027** 12 6 3.299 0.122 
Constant N/A N/A -4.954 0.002* N/A N/A -0.593 0.468 N/A N/A 0.809 0.353 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey  
Note: p-values are for two-tailed tests.  
∗ Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 10% level 
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TABLE 4 
Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in BIP/VSIP/CS-SIP 
(by frequency, popular ranking, and maximum likelihood estimate) 
 
 BIP VSIP CS-SIP 
Factors Freq Rank α coeff. p-value Freq Rank α coeff. p-value Freq Rank α coeff. p-value 
Shortage of skilled/semi-skilled labors 1 14 -3.870 0.033** 25 2 1.311 0.015** 18 5 -0.570 0.355 
Shortage of professionals or managers 10 8 -2.327 0.084*** 34 1 -0.012 0.983 32 2 0.532 0.447 
Rising labor costs 19 3 1.909 0.154 6 11 -2.587 0.000* 19 4 1.340 0.043** 
Low labor productivity 10 8 0.300 0.808 11 8 -1.771 0.003* 25 3 2.422 0.001* 
High absenteeism 2 13 -1.861 0.179 6 11 0.100 0.884 10 9 0.650 0.420 
Industrial relation problems 15 6 3.987 0.015** 6 11 -0.222 0.765 1 14 -0.006 0.009* 
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 5 11 0.529 0.671 9 9 -0.298 0.650 11 8 0.638 0.366 
Difficulty sourcing raw material 16 5 1.139 0.347 18 5 0.925 0.096*** 5 13 -1.959 0.005* 
Difficulty introducing new technology/techniques 10 8 1.838 0.172 8 10 -0.426 0.494 10 9 -0.396 0.611 
Difficulty sourcing fund for expansion 4 12 1.161 0.432 5 14 -0.122 0.874 8 11 0.032 0.971 
Lack of good supporting services 11 7 -0.646 0.606 16 7 0.108 0.844 12 7 -0.263 0.687 
High/rising overhead costs 18 4 1.187 0.310 18 5 0.243 0.622 18 5 -1.015 0.070 
Government regulation 22 1 4.389 0.002* 22 3 1.131 0.046** 6 12 -3.153 0.000* 
Competition from overseas competitors 20 2 0.061 0.963 22 3 -0.432 0.408 33 1 0.458 0.449 
Constant N/A N/A -5.891 0.001* N/A N/A -0.093 0.882 N/A N/A 0.156 0.831 
 
Source: Questionnaire survey  
Note: p-values are for two-tailed tests.  
∗ Significant at 1% level 
** Significant at 5% level 
*** Significant at 10% level 
